Jean-Luc Nancy et l’énigme de la singularité

Florian Forestier


Singularity does not belong to the question of the self, in the sense subjectivity or selfhood. Singularity is not a type of experience ; it is somehow experience itself, in its constitutive inability to support and build itself. I can not be anything other than me. The world is experienced within the contingency of the perspective I have: none other than this one. Avoiding the pitfalls of phenomenology and its surreptitious temptation of substantification, yet not adopting the other extreme of Wittgensteinian silence, Nancy develops a speculative thought of the world as a singularizing impetus and material thought of the body as space and pace.


Singularity - Ipséité - Subjectivity - Body - Phenomenology – Différance

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ISSN: 2281-3209                DOI Prefix: 10.7408

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